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Protecting the Appropriations Power:  
Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the 
Department of Justice 
Todd David Peterson∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent 
presidentially declared war on terror,1 the President and the 
executive branch assumed new powers to respond to the perceived 
terrorist threat. Some of these powers, like those granted by the 
Patriot Act2 and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force,3 
were granted by Congress. Other authority, such as the power to 
authorize the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to conduct 
warrantless wiretaps on American citizens4 and the power to use 
coercive interrogation techniques5 were assumed by the President 
without any congressional authorization. The President took these 
actions in accordance with secret legal opinions issued by the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”).6 The 
OLC memoranda supported a conception of the President’s 
 
∗ Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments received from Fred Lawrence, Peter Raven-
Hansen and Jennifer Waters on earlier drafts and the expert research assistance of Mike 
Hissam. 
 1. See Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18, 2001); Exec. Order 
No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sept. 18, 2001); see also John F. Harris & Mike Allen, 
President Details Global War on Terrorists and Supporters, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at A1. 
 2. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272.  
 3. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 4. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash is Latest Chapter in Bush 
Effort to Widen Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A1. 
 5. See Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at 
A1. 
 6. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO 
ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
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commander-in-chief powers that was so broad as to be virtually 
unlimited, and they rejected the notion that Congress could 
statutorily control the President’s exercise of this authority.7 
Not surprisingly, the OLC memoranda prompted a storm of 
protest.8 One commentator wrote that the OLC’s torture 
memorandum was not something “of which anyone could be 
proud” and that “[t]he overwhelming response by experts in 
criminal, international, constitutional, and military law was that the 
legal analysis in the government memos was so faulty that the 
lawyers’ advice was incompetent.”9 This critique of the OLC 
memoranda prompted observers to question the process by which 
the memoranda were created, a process that excluded anyone who 
might have differing views and that was designed to create a brief for 
presidential authority rather than a deliberate and independent 
assessment of the powers of the President.10 Scholars have begun to 
question whether the Department of Justice, the Office of the 
Solicitor General (“SG”), and OLC, in particular, were capable of 
providing anything other than position papers on behalf of 
unrestricted presidential power.11 
As a result, these criticisms have caused some to wonder whether 
the Department of Justice can adequately protect the constitutional 
separation of powers in its current form. Although many would 
agree with former OLC chief, Theodore Olson, that “it is not our 
function to prepare an advocate’s brief or simply to find support for 
what we or our clients might like the law to be,”12 other 
commentators have begun to suggest that the Department of Justice 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. See, e.g., Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor 
in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); Julie Angell, Comment, 
Ethics, Torture and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, 18 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 557 (2005); Marisa Lopez, Note, Professional Responsibility: Tortured 
Independence in the Office of Legal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REV. 685 (2005). 
 9. Wendel, supra note 8, at 68. 
 10. See id. at 70. 
 11. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in 
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 682–83 (2005). 
 12. Id. at 727 (quoting Theodore B. Olson, Remarks to the Federal Legal Council 5 
(Oct. 29, 1981)); see also Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A 
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (2000) (arguing 
that the OLC has an institutional obligation to provide an independent and non-vertically 
directed view of the law). 
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needs to develop new internal checks on the issuance of legal 
opinions13 or have even questioned whether the Constitution should 
be amended to make the Attorney General independent from the 
President’s control.14 
These proposals are not new. Congress held hearings on the 
possibility of an independent Department of Justice after the 
Watergate scandal.15 The issue was also raised by President Carter, 
who requested the Department of Justice to analyze whether 
Congress could constitutionally make the Department of Justice 
independent from the President’s control.16 The tendency of all these 
discussions is to focus upon visible assertions of presidential 
authority. The exercise of presidential authority in the area of 
national security or war power certainly grabs our attention and 
demonstrates the importance of independent and unbiased legal 
advice that properly constrains the exercise of presidential authority.  
But these dramatic examples of presidential power are not the 
only context in which the Department of Justice exercises 
considerable authority over the constitutional separation of powers. 
There are innumerable ways in which the Department’s control over 
the litigation on behalf of the United States gives it the opportunity 
to respect or to evade the authority allocated so carefully by the 
Constitution. In particular, the Department’s actions can respect or 
subvert the Constitution’s grant of appropriations authority to 
Congress. 
The Constitution clearly and unambiguously places control over 
the appropriation of federal funds squarely in the hands of 
Congress.17 The Framers recognized that the control over the power 
 
 13. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336–37 (2006). 
 14. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State Attorneys General, 
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449 n.5 (2006). 
 15. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974).  
 16. See Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney General, 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 75, 77–78 (1977) (concluding that proposals to make the Attorney General 
independent would be unconstitutional). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Numerous scholars have outlined the general contours 
of Congress’s appropriations authority. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the 
Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297 (1998); Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-
Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 
MIL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 
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of the purse was the foundation of Parliament’s ability to resist the 
authority of the king, and they gave Congress the same power so 
that it would have the ultimate weapon against executive tyranny.18 
Congress has unquestionably used this authority effectively to 
control not only the amount of federal expenditures, but also the 
policy priorities of the federal government and, through explicitly 
targeted restrictions on the appropriations, the conduct of the other 
branches.19 
In spite of this authority, or perhaps indeed because of 
Congress’s great power, the executive branch has sought ways to 
circumvent congressional control over the federal purse and achieve 
its own ends outside of the will of Congress. Most famously in recent 
years, the Reagan Administration sought to avoid the Boland 
Amendment—a congressional restriction on aiding the Nicaraguan 
Contras—through the use of funds obtained from the covert sale of 
arms to Iran.20 But executive efforts to evade congressional control 
over the appropriations process go back much further than the Iran-
Contra affair. During the Nineteenth Century, executive agencies, 
particularly the War Department, routinely entered into contracts for 
which there were no appropriations and put Congress in the 
awkward position of having to fund the contract or tell government 
contractors that they were not going to be paid for material delivered 
to the federal government. In response, Congress enacted the 
Antideficiency Act to prohibit the obligation of federal funds for 
which there was no existing appropriation.21 Executive branch 
contracting officials proved so adept at avoiding or just plain 
ignoring the Antideficiency Act, however, that Congress found it 
necessary to amend the Act multiple times.22 Finally, Congress 
 
(1988); Charles Tiefer, Controlling Federal Agencies by Claims on Their Appropriations? The 
Takings Bill and the Power of the Purse, 13 YALE J. ON. REG. 501 (1996). 
 18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 394 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961). 
 19. See generally WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1994); PAUL EINZIG, THE CONTROL OF THE PURSE 
(1959); E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
FINANCE, 1776–1790 (1961). 
 20. See S. REP. NO. 100-216 (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 100-433 (1987) (hereinafter 
Hearings); Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 837 (1994). 
 21. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000). 
 22. See S. DOC. NO. 87-11, at 45–46 (1961). See infra pg. 13 for a more in-depth 
discussion of the Antideficiency Act. 
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became so fed up with the evasion of its appropriations authority 
that it amended the Act to provide criminal sanctions for the 
violation of its provisions.23 Because that did not exhaust the 
ingenuity of executive officials in finding innovative ways around the 
appropriations process, Congress adopted other statutes to enforce 
its exclusive authority over the appropriations process. For example, 
the Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires executive branch agencies to 
deposit any monies collected by the agency in the general Treasury 
account, which prevents the agencies from supplementing their 
appropriations budget.24 
But Congress cannot close every loophole in the appropriations 
process and entirely prevent the executive branch from finding ways 
around its appropriations authority. In particular, the litigation 
authority of the Department of Justice allows it to circumvent 
Congress’s appropriations power in two different ways. First, when 
the Department is enforcing a federal statute, it may propose a 
settlement that requires the defendant to perform certain actions that 
benefit the Department or other federal agency. These actions may 
not violate the Miscellaneous Receipts Act because there are 
technically no “receipts,” but it circumvents Congress’s 
appropriations power by augmenting the agency’s budget. 
Second, when the Department defends cases brought against the 
federal government, it may wish to compensate plaintiffs for political 
reasons or because the administration favors the plaintiff’s cause, 
even though the plaintiff’s legal claim is weak. This type of action is 
aided by the existence of the Judgment Fund, a permanent unlimited 
appropriation that may be used for paying judgments and 
settlements against the United States without charging the budget of 
any executive branch agency. Settlements that take advantage of this 
governmental deep pocket to evade Congress’s appropriations power 
amount to unauthorized grants to the plaintiffs. 
Although the settlement practices of the Department of Justice 
are not open to public view, there is no reason to believe that a 
Department that is committed to an advocacy model in advising the 
President on his constitutional authority would shrink from a 
settlement policy that permitted political judgments to displace 
litigation risk assessments. Such practices would amount to an 
 
 23. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1350, 1519 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) (2000). 
 24. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000). 
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invisible but substantial usurpation of Congress’s appropriations 
power. The same concerns that have driven scholars to propose a set 
of neutral principles to guide OLC’s provision of legal advice,25 also 
counsel the creation of a set of settlement principles to guide the 
Department’s litigation decisions in a manner that respects the 
appropriations prerogatives of Congress. 
This Article proceeds in three steps to analyze the implications of 
these issues. Part I examines Congress’s appropriations power and 
the ways in which the executive branch has attempted to circumvent 
that authority. Part II explores the extent to which the settlement 
authority of the Department of Justice creates continuing loopholes 
in Congress’s appropriations authority. In particular, two types of 
problems are identified: the Augmentation Problem and the 
Unauthorized Grant Problem, both of which enable the Department 
to utilize its settlement authority to evade Congress’s exclusive 
control over appropriations. Finally, in Part III, this Article examines 
the ability of the judicial and legislative branches to oversee the 
Department’s settlement practices and concludes that, as a practical 
matter, there is little the other branches can do to protect Congress’s 
appropriations authority from concerted efforts to use the 
Department’s settlement authority to circumvent Congress’s control 
over the appropriations process. As a result, the Department must 
commit to a set of principles to guide settlements that will help to 
ensure that the Department respects the constitutional preeminence 
of Congress on the appropriation of funds from the Federal 
Treasury. 
I. CONGRESS’S APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORITY AND THE 
EXECUTIVE’S ATTEMPTS TO EVADE IT 
Congress’s constitutional appropriation authority derives from 
British practice. Although English kings had many sources of 
revenue upon which they could draw without the need for 
parliamentary authorization, there were occasions, particularly when 
undertaking significant military operations, when the Crown was 
forced to turn to Parliament for additional sources of revenue.26 
Beginning in the fourteenth century, Parliament’s growing authority 
 
 25. See infra at pp. 47–49. 
 26. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 20, at 891 (explaining how ordinary royal 
revenue was “sufficient for most domestic purposes for centuries”). 
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over the king developed from its power over military supplies.27 The 
Crown often attempted to bypass this parliamentary authority by 
obtaining funds from private citizens and foreign governments.28 
However, these open attempts to circumvent Parliament’s authority 
contributed to civil war and resulted in “the loss by Charles I of his 
office and his head.”29 
By the end of the seventeenth century, Parliament had succeeded 
in wresting control over appropriations from the Crown. In 1678, 
the House of Commons asserted that it had the exclusive right to 
grant “aids and supplies” on such terms and conditions as it adopted 
in appropriations bills.30 In the 1689 Bill of Rights, Parliament 
forbade the raising or maintenance of a standing army during peace 
time and the raising of money by “pretense of prerogative” without 
its consent.31 Thus, by the time the colonies began to be established 
in America, the British legislature had assumed plenary control over 
the appropriations process. 
The colonial legislatures adopted this model and asserted their 
authority over military expenditures. Because English colonial policy 
required the colonies to finance their own defense, the colonial 
legislatures used their appropriations authority to control how that 
money would be spent.32 Using this power, the colonial legislatures 
frequently overrode the colonial governors’ control over the military 
and dictated many of the details of military service and supplies.33 
Indeed, the Revolutionary War itself was, in many respects, 
controlled and managed by committees of the Continental 
Congress.34  
The tensions created by the Continental Congress’s control over 
both the funding and the operations of the military led the Framers 
to divide the authority to direct military operations from the power 
 
 27. See EINZIG, supra note 19, at 29. 
 28. Id. at 57–62. 
 29. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 212 (3d ed., Univ. Press of Kan., 1991) (1978). 
 30. EINZIG, supra note 19, at 113–14. 
 31. 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1689) (Eng.). 
 32. See Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 20, at 892. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 197 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1979); JENNINGS B. 
SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 
1774–1789, at 6–7 (1935). 
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to fund such operations. The President was made “Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia 
of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States . . . .”35 The Framers gave to Congress “the Power To 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence [sic] and general Welfare of 
the United States . . . .”36 Article I, section 9 of the Constitution 
grants the appropriation power solely to Congress: “No Money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law . . . .”37 One scholar has argued that even if there were 
no Appropriations Clause in the Constitution, Congress would have 
the legislative authority to enact the substantial equivalent of the 
Appropriations Clause because, “[i]f Congress could not prohibit the 
Executive from withdrawing funds from the Treasury, then the 
constitutional grants of power to the legislature to raise taxes and to 
borrow money would be for naught because the Executive could 
effectively compel such legislation by spending at will.”38 The 
Framers understood that by giving Congress the exclusive power to 
appropriate funds, they endowed Congress with substantial authority 
over the shape and direction of the federal government. In The 
Federalist, Hamilton wrote that “money is with propriety considered 
as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life 
and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions.”39 
Similarly, Madison argued that 
The house of representatives can not only refuse, but they alone 
can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. 
They in a word hold the purse; that powerful instrument by which 
we behold in the history of the British constitution, an infant and 
humble representation of the people, gradually enlarging the 
sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as 
it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other 
branches of the government. This power over the purse, may in fact 
be regarded as the most [complete] and effectual weapon with 
which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 36. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 37. Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 38. Stith, supra note 17, at 1349. 
 39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for 
carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.40 
The Framers vested Congress with this authority precisely because it 
was the most representative branch; the immediate accountability of 
Congress, particularly the House, protects taxpayers from excessive 
taxation and insures equitable distribution of government funds.41 
The Framers also anticipated that Congress’s appropriation 
power would give it the right to specify not only the amount of 
government expenditures, but also control the purposes to which 
those expenditures would be put. As Alexander Hamilton explained, 
“no money can be expended, but for an object, to an extent, and out 
of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.”42 Although the very first 
appropriations bill adopted by the new Congress contained only four 
general categories of spending,43 subsequent appropriations bills 
confined much more narrowly the purposes for which the funds 
could be put.44  
The Supreme Court has frequently recognized Congress’s 
exclusive appropriation authority. The Court has stated that the 
Appropriations Clause “means simply that no money can be paid out 
of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of 
Congress.”45 In Hart v. United States,46 the Court of Claims ruled 
that “absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in 
Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great 
power only to the people.”47 This authority requires that Congress 
must act first before the federal government may spend: “The 
established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only 
when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be 
 
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 394. 
 41. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 740 
(1978); Abner J. Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1986). 
 42. 8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 128 (Henry 
Cabot Lodge ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1885). 
 43. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95.  
 44. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 325–29; see also Peter Raven-Hansen 
& William C. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief’s Spending 
Power, 81 IOWA L. REV. 79, 99 (1995). 
 45. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (citing Reeside v. 
Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1851)). 
 46. Hart v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 459 (1880), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886). 
 47. Id. at 484.  
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expended unless prohibited by Congress.”48 Even with respect to the 
President’s exclusive and unrestricted power to grant a pardon, the 
Court has refused to order a payment from the Treasury of proceeds 
derived from the sale of a pardoned convict’s forfeited property. In 
Knote v. United States,49 the Court held: 
[I]f the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right to 
them has so far become vested in the United States that they can 
only be secured to the former owner of the property through an act 
of Congress. Moneys once in the treasury can only be withdrawn 
by an appropriation by law. However large, therefore, may be the 
power of pardon possessed by the President, and however extended 
may be its application, there is this limit to it, as there is to all his 
powers,—it cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United 
States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress. The 
Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.50 
Thus, the meaning of the Appropriations Clause can be summed 
up in a few simple propositions. First, once money is placed in the 
Treasury of the United States, it may not be withdrawn or spent 
without express authorization from Congress. Second, the President 
is dependent upon a congressional appropriation for the funding of 
the executive branch and the implementation of the powers that are 
granted to him by the Constitution. Finally, Congress may impose 
restrictions on the use of funds that limit the President’s authority in 
exercising his own constitutional power. As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, “Any exercise of a power granted by the Constitution to 
one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid 
reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.”51 
The executive branch cannot obligate the expenditure of funds 
without congressional action on appropriations. For example, in 
Schism v. United States,52 retired military personnel sued the federal 
government for breach of an implied-in-fact contract.53 Plaintiffs 
claimed that military recruiters had promised free lifetime medical 
care for them and their dependents in exchange for twenty years of 
 
 48. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976). 
 49. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877). 
 50. Id. at 154. 
 51. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990). 
 52. Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 
910 (2003). 
 53. Id. at 1262. 
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service.54 In rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments, the Federal Circuit 
noted: 
As Commander-in-Chief, the President does not have the 
constitutional authority to make promises about entitlements for 
life to military personnel that bind the government because such 
powers would encroach on Congress’ constitutional prerogative to 
appropriate funding. Under Article I, § 8, only Congress has the 
power of the purse. To say that the Executive Branch could 
promise future funds for activities that Congress itself had not 
authorized . . . would allow the Executive Branch to commandeer 
the power of the Legislative Branch.55 
Congress not only may specify the amount of funds available but 
may also dictate the terms and conditions under which the funds 
may be used: 
Congress can decree, either in the appropriation itself or by 
separate statutory provisions, what will be required to make the 
appropriation “legally available” for any expenditure. It can, for 
example, describe the purposes for which the funds may be used, 
the length of time the funds may remain available for these uses, 
and the maximum amount an agency may spend on particular 
elements of a program. In this manner, Congress may, and often 
does, use its appropriation power to accomplish policy objectives 
and to establish priorities among federal programs.56 
The Supreme Court has also upheld Congress’s authority to 
suspend or cancel federal programs through restrictions and 
appropriations bills.57 Congress may also include preconditions in an 
appropriations bill that prevent the use of appropriated funds until 
certain requirements are met in order to effectuate congressional 
oversight of a federal program.58 Moreover, the Appropriations 
Clause does not dictate to Congress how it shall implement its 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1288. 
 56. 1 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW 1-5 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter GAO REDBOOK]. 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980) (holding that Congress 
intended, in an appropriations statute, to amend the salaries paid to federal judges); United 
States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940). 
 58. See AT&T v. United States, 307 F.3d 1374, 1376–79 (Fed. Cir. 2003) These 
provisions permit “the appropriate legislative committees to monitor compliance and, 
presumably, guarantee enforcement in the form of future reductions in, or limitations on, 
appropriated funds”. Id. at 1377. 
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appropriations power. Instead, with one exception,59 Congress has 
the authority to do this either through the annual budgeting process 
or through permanent funding statutes.60 
It did not take long for the executive branch to begin to resist 
Congress’s plenary authority over the appropriations process. In 
1809, Senator James Hillhouse of Connecticut introduced a 
resolution to investigate possible methods to prevent the improper 
expenditure of federal funds.61 In 1816 and 1817, Senator John C. 
Calhoun protested against the diversion of federal funds for uses 
other than those specified by Congress.62 Congress began early on to 
enact statutes to enforce its appropriations prerogatives. In 1809, 
Congress enacted a forerunner of the current purpose statute63 in 
order to prohibit the transfer of appropriations between different 
executive accounts.64 
Congress faced an even more vexing challenge to its 
appropriations authority in the executive’s practice of obligating 
expenditures by assigning a contract without the existence of an 
available appropriation to pay for the items under contract. These so-
called “coercive deficiencies” presented Congress with a difficult 
dilemma: they could either fail to fund the contract and thus injure 
the blameless contractor, or acknowledge the moral obligation to 
pay and allow the executive branch to force an appropriation. These 
repeated coercive deficiencies rankled congressional sensibilities: 
A consistent theme runs through myriad pages of floor debates and 
reports on supplemental appropriation bills: The Congress was 
tired of receiving appropriation requests which it could not, in 
good conscience, refuse because the agency had legally or morally 
committed the United States to make good on a promise. We term 
 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 states that Congress shall have power to “raise and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than 
two Years.” The Department of Justice and GAO have both construed this two-year limit to 
apply only to personnel, operations, and maintenance, and not to other military appropriations, 
such as weapons systems procurement or military construction. See 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 555 
(1948); 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 105 (1904). 
 60. See 1 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 56, at 1–11.  
 61. 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 347 (1809) (remarks of Sen. Hillhouse). 
 62. See Gary L. Hopkins & Robert M. Nutt, The Anti Deficiency Act (Revised Statutes 
3679) and Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis, 80 MIL. L. REV. 51, 57 n.7 (1978). 
 63. See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2007) (“Appropriations shall be applied only to the 
objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.”). 
 64. See Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 535. 
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such commitments “coercive deficiencies” because the Congress 
has little choice but to appropriate the necessary funds.65 
In order to put a halt to these practices, Congress passed the 
Antideficiency Act in 1820, which stated that “no contract shall 
hereafter be made by the Secretary of State, or of the Treasury, or of 
the Department of War, or of the Navy, except under a law 
authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its 
fulfillment . . . .”66 In 1870, Congress expanded the statute to apply 
to all federal agencies.67 Notwithstanding the far-reaching language 
of the 1870 statute, Congress continued to face so many compliance 
problems that in 1905 it amended the Antideficiency Act to add 
criminal penalties for violation of the Act.68 Although there is no 
record of any criminal prosecutions having been brought under the 
Act, the in terrorem effect of the criminal sanctions has been enough 
to get the executive branch to take the provisions of the Act 
seriously.69 The 1905 amendments also required the executive 
agencies to apportion annual appropriations in order to prevent the 
agency from exhausting its appropriation before the end of the year 
and seeking a supplemental appropriation, and it prohibited 
executive agencies from accepting voluntary services on the theory 
that such voluntary services might result in a later claim that 
Congress was morally obligated to provide compensation for those 
services.70 Even so, some commentators have concluded that 
enforcement of the Antideficiency Act remains inconsistent.71 
 
 65. See 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372 (1980). 
 66. Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, § 6, 3 Stat. 567, 568. 
 67. The 1870 Act provided that: 
[I]t shall not be lawful for any department of the government to expend in any one 
fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year, 
or to involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in 
excess of such appropriations. 
Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 230, 251.  
 68. See Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, 1257–58. The criminal 
penalty of the Act is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003). 
 69. See Stith, supra note 17, at 1371 n.140. 
 70. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1257; see 30 Op. Att’y Gen. 51, 52–53 
(1913). 
 71. See Herbert L. Fenster & Christian Volz, The Antideficiency Act: Constitutional 
Control Gone Astray, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155 (1979). 
[I]t has been the habit of certain departments—but principally the Department of 
Defense—to ignore, selectively, the entire subject [of the Antideficiency Act 
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The executive branch quickly learned that there was more than 
one way to get around Congress’s appropriations power. Since the 
Constitution prohibits the withdrawal of money from the Treasury in 
the absence of a congressional appropriation, one way to avoid 
Congress’s authority is to divert funds received by an agency to that 
agency’s uses before they are directly deposited in the Treasury. 
Thus, an agency might attempt to retain or use the judgments it was 
authorized or able to collect in order to supplement their own 
appropriations. 
Although one could certainly argue that the act of diverting 
money received by the government before it was to be deposited in 
the Treasury violates one of the implied requirements of the 
Appropriations Clause,72 Congress sought to close this loophole 
legislatively by adopting the Miscellaneous Receipts Act in 1849, 
which provided that all funds “received from customs, from the sales 
of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources, for the use of the 
United States, shall be paid . . . into the treasury of the United States 
 
requirements] when exigencies demand. Such selective disregard has been made 
possible by the tacit—but clearly conscious—indulgence of Congress . . . . 
 
The deterioration, or veritable nonexistence, of the expenditure control discipline, 
has had far-ranging negative ramifications. Congress is substantially unable to plan 
accurately for the appropriation of funds and the authorization of programs. . . . 
 
As consistent experience since enactment [of the Antideficiency Act] has shown, 
even this updated form of the Act has failed to compel the executive departments to 
manage their appropriations so as to avoid deficiencies . . . . [T]he executive still has 
not accepted its responsibility under the Act to have funds currently available to 
cover liabilities (obligations) as it incurs them in the contracting process. . . . 
  
The Antideficiency Act was intended to compel the government to institute 
businesslike fiscal management practices so that deficiencies would never arise. In 
practice, however, it has succeeded only in preventing the government from making 
payments of money in excess or advance of appropriations; it has failed to stop the 
creation of obligations in excess or advance of available money.  
Id. at 156, 166−167, 182. 
 72. See Stith, supra note 17, at 1356 (“These conclusions deprived from the 
Constitution’s appropriations clause may be summarized in two governing principles. First, the 
Principle of the Public Fisc: All funds belonging to the United States—received from whatever 
source, however obtained, and whether in the form of cash, intangible property, or fiscal 
assets—are public monies, subject to public control and accountability. This principle implies 
that all monies received by the United States are in ‘The Treasury,’ to use the language of the 
Constitution. ‘The Treasury’ includes not only tax receipts, but also any borrowing on the 
credit of the United States and proceeds from the sale of government goods and services and 
gifts to the government.”). 
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. . . .”73 As now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3302, the Miscellaneous 
Receipts Act requires that any “official or agent of the Government 
receiving money for the Government from any source shall deposit 
the money in the Treasury . . . .”74 Under this provision, any money 
received by an executive agency from a source outside the agency 
must be deposited into the general fund of the Treasury and not into 
the agency’s own appropriations account “even though the agency’s 
appropriations may be technically still ‘in the Treasury’ until the 
agency actually spends them.”75 As one early decision by the 
Comptroller of the Treasury explained, the Miscellaneous Receipts 
Act 
could hardly be made more comprehensive as to the monies that 
are meant and these monies are required to be paid “into the 
Treasury.” This does not mean that the moneys are to be added to 
a fund that has been appropriated from the Treasury and may be in 
the Treasury or outside. It seems to be that it can only mean that 
they shall go into the general fund of the Treasury which is subject 
to any disposition which Congress might choose to make of it. This 
has been the holding of the accounting officers for many years. If 
Congress intended that these moneys should be returned to the 
appropriation from which a similar amount had been once 
expended it could have been readily so stated, and it was not.76 
The GAO succinctly summarized the significance of this provision:  
Once money is deposited into a “miscellaneous receipts” account, 
it takes an appropriation to get it out. [T]hus, the effect of 31 
U.S.C. § 3302(b) is to ensure that the executive branch remains 
dependent upon the congressional appropriation process. Viewed 
from this perspective, [the Act] emerges as another element in the 
statutory pattern by which Congress retains control of the public 
purse under the separation of powers doctrine.77  
An agency may obtain monies it receives only if the receipts qualify 
as “‘repayments’ to an appropriation”78 or if the agency has express 
 
 73. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 110, 9 Stat. 398, 398. 
 74. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2007). 
 75. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 56, at 6-167. 
 76. 22 Comp. Dec. 379, 381 (1916). 
 77. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 56, at 6-168–169 (citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 6-170; see, e.g., 6 Comp. Gen. 337, 337–338 (1926); 5 Comp. Gen. 734, 736 
(1926).  
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statutory authority to do so.79 Despite Congress’s effort to shore up 
the loopholes that allow executive encroachment into Congress’s 
appropriations power, opportunities still exist for executive 
encroachment. 
II. CONTINUING LOOPHOLES IN CONGRESS’S APPROPRIATIONS 
AUTHORITY 
Because the Department of Justice possesses the authority to 
litigate on behalf of the United States, it is uniquely positioned to 
take advantage of several possible loopholes in Congress’s well-
constructed statutory defense of its constitutional appropriations 
prerogative. In particular, the ability to settle cases without 
significant review from the courts or Congress gives the Department 
the potential both to augment the budgets of federal agencies in 
enforcement cases brought against private defendants and to use the 
judgment fund to make, effectively, unauthorized grants to plaintiffs 
in suits brought against the government. 
A. The Settlement Authority of the Department of Justice 
The settlement authority of the Department of Justice derives 
from its role as litigator on behalf of the United States government. 
Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 vested plenary authority over the 
legal affairs of the United States in the Attorney General,80 the 
 
 79. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 56, at 6-170. As Professor Stith has described: 
“There are three major types of legislation that create exceptions to the general requirement of 
the Miscellaneous Receipts statute: first, legislation that allows agencies to retain certain 
‘collections’; second, legislation that permits agencies to create certain ‘revolving funds’; and, 
third, legislation that grants certain agencies ‘gift authority.’” Stith, supra note 17, at 1366.  
Some agencies that are allowed to charge fees for services are permitted to retain these 
fees as part of the agency’s appropriation account. See., e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 8109 (providing that 
the Veterans’ Benefit Administration may retain parking fees). Revolving funds are created by 
Congress with an initial appropriation that is then loaned out or distributed to recipients (such 
as in the case of student loans), who are then expected to repay the amounts back into the 
revolving fund. Stith, supra note 17, at 1366–67. Gift authority allows an agency to keep 
money voluntarily donated to it, which the Miscellaneous Receipts Act would otherwise 
require to be deposited in the general Treasury account. Id. at 1368–67. 
 80. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (“[T]here shall . . . be appointed 
a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be 
sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and 
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to 
give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the 
United States, or when requested by heads of any of the departments, touching any matters 
that may concern their departments . . . .”). 
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Attorney General’s statutory authority to conduct litigation on 
behalf of the United States was not fully established until Congress 
created the Department of Justice in 1870.81 In addition to 
establishing the Department of Justice, the 1870 Act transferred 
certain specified solicitors who were performing litigation functions 
within the various agencies to the Department of Justice where they 
were to be supervised by the Attorney General.82 The Act also gave 
the Attorney General supervisory authority over the United States 
District Attorneys who litigated in the various judicial districts and 
“also [over] all other attorneys and counselors employed in any cases 
or business in which the United States may be concerned.”83 Finally, 
the 1870 Act prohibited other executive branch departments from 
employing attorneys or outside counsel at government expense. 
Instead they were required to:  
[C]all upon the Department of Justice, . . . and no counsel or 
attorney fees shall hereafter be allowed to any person . . . besides 
the respective district attorneys . . . for services in such capacity to 
the United States, . . . unless hereafter authorized by law, and then 
only on the certificate of the Attorney-General that such services  
. . . could not be performed by the Attorney-General, . . . or the 
officers of the department of the justice . . . .84  
Thus, by granting the Department of Justice virtually exclusive 
litigating authority for the United States, Congress sought to 
centralize decision-making concerning litigated cases and create a 
“unity of decision, a unity of jurisprudence . . . in the executive law 
of the United States.”85 Centralization also allowed for more efficient 
preparation of cases on appeal and before the Supreme Court.86 
In the years following the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 
1870, the courts recognized and enforced the exclusive litigating 
authority of the Department of Justice. In United States v. San 
 
 81. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162. 
 82. Id. at § 3, 16 Stat. 162. 
 83. Id. at § 16, 16 Stat. 164. 
 84. Id. at § 17, 16 Stat. 164. 
 85. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 30–36 (1870). 
 86. See generally Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief 
Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049 (1978) 
(recounting the historical development of the office of Attorney General as well as the 
Department of Justice); Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 
165 (1938) (discussing how historical “trial and error” has proven the efficiency of handling 
the government’s litigation under the Attorney General).  
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Jacinto Tin Co.,87 the Supreme Court stated that the Attorney 
General was “undoubtedly the officer who has charge of the 
institution and conduct of the pleas of the United States, and of the 
litigation which is necessary to establish the rights of the 
government.”88 The Court later ruled that the Attorney General’s 
authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States could 
be limited only by a clear legislative statement to the contrary.89 In 
the early part of the twentieth century, Judge Learned Hand 
summarized the litigating authority of the Attorney General as 
follows: 
The government has provided legal officers, presumably 
competent, charged with the duty of protecting its rights in its 
courts. . . . Congress, having so provided for the prosecution of 
civil suits, can scarcely be supposed to have contemplated a possible 
duplication in legal personnel. The cost of this is one consideration, 
but far more important is the centering of responsibility for the 
conduct of public litigation. The Attorney General has powers of 
“general superintendence and direction” over district attorneys 
(title 5, U.S. Code, § 317), and may directly intervene to “conduct 
and argue any case in any court of the United States” (title 5, U.S. 
Code, § 309) . . . . Thus he may displace district attorneys in their 
own suits, dismiss or compromise them, institute those which they 
decline to press. No such system is capable of operation unless his 
powers are exclusive, or if the Departments may institute suits 
which he cannot control. His powers must be coextensive with his 
duties.90 
The litigating authority of the Attorney General is now codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 3106 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 515–516. The Title V 
Provision prohibits executive agencies from employing outside 
counsel and requires them to seek representation from the 
Department of Justice in cases in which their agencies appear in 
 
 87. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). 
 88. Id. at 279. 
 89. Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147, 155 (1921) (“In the absence of 
some legislative direction to the contrary, and there is none, the general authority of the 
Attorney General in respect of the pleas of the United States and the litigation which is 
necessary to establish and safeguard its rights affords ample warrant for the institution and 
prosecution by him of a suit such as this.”). 
 90. Sutherland v. Int’l Ins. Co. of N.Y., 43 F.2d 969, 970 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 
282 U.S. 890 (1930). 
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court.91 The provisions of Title 28 grant the Attorney General the 
power to supervise and control litigation on behalf of the United 
States. Section 516 states: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, 
the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or 
officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence 
therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under 
the direction of the Attorney General.”92 Congress has authorized 
some agencies to conduct certain types of cases on their own, but 
these exceptions to the Attorney General’s statutory litigation 
authority have been construed narrowly to allow agencies to proceed 
on their own only when a statute clearly and unambiguously grants 
such authority.93 
The litigating authority of the Department of Justice includes as 
a necessary incident the power to settle and compromise cases. For 
example, in 1933, President Roosevelt issued an executive order to 
supplement the statutory powers of the Attorney General to manage 
litigation on behalf of the United States. In addition to centralizing 
the power to initiate cases on behalf of the United States and defend 
cases brought against the United States, the executive order stated: 
As to any case referred to the Department of Justice for a 
prosecution or defense in the courts, the function of decision 
whether and in what manner to prosecute, or to defend, or to 
compromise, or to appeal, or to abandon a prosecution or defense, 
 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (2004) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an 
Executive department or military department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the 
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or employee thereof is a party, or 
is interested, or for the securing of evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the 
Department of Justice.”). 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2003). In addition, § 519 states: 
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all 
litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and 
shall direct all United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special 
attorneys appointed under Section 543 of this title in the discharge of their 
respective duties. 
 93. See Marshall v. Gibson’s Prods., Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668, 676 n.11 (5th Cir. 
1978) (“[I]n the absence of an express congressional directive to the contrary, [the Attorney 
General] is vested with plenary power over all litigation to which the United States or one of 
its agencies is a party.”); see also ICC v. S. Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 535–38 (5th Cir. 1976);  
In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 1975); FTC v. Guignon, 390 
F.2d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Tonry, 433 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D. La. 
1977). 
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now exercised by any agency or officer, is transferred to the 
Department of Justice.94 
Several years later, Roosevelt’s Attorney General Homer 
Cummings concluded that the power to settle or compromise 
litigation: 
[I]s a power, whether attaching to the office or conferred by statute 
or Executive order, to be exercised with wise discretion and 
resorted to only to promote the Government’s best interest or to 
prevent flagrant injustice, but that it is broad and plenary may be 
asserted with equal assurance, and it attaches, of course, 
immediately upon the receipt of a case in the Department of 
Justice, carrying with it both civil and criminal features, if both 
exist, and any other matter germane to the case which the Attorney 
General may find it necessary or proper to consider before he 
invokes the aid of the courts; nor does it end with the entry of 
judgment, but embraces execution.95 
This inherent settlement authority is buttressed by various 
sections of the United States Code, which speak directly to the 
power to settle or compromise cases.96 Based upon the litigation 
authority of the Attorney General the courts have recognized the 
power of the Attorney General permits him to settle or compromise 
claims in his discretion.97 
 
 94. Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 note. 
 95. 38 Op. Att’y Gen. 98, 102 (1934). 
 96. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2003) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, 
compromise settlements of claims referred to the Attorney General for defense of imminent 
litigation or suits against the United States, or against its agencies or officials upon obligations 
or liabilities of the United States, made by the Attorney General or any person authorized by 
him, shall be settled and paid in a manner similar to judgments in like causes . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2677 (2003) (“The Attorney General or his designee may arbitrate, compromise, or settle 
any claim cognizable under [28 U.S.C.] § 1346(b) . . . after the commencement of an action 
thereon.”). 
 97. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 308 (1921) (“[W]e cannot doubt 
that the intervention of the government was proper in this case and that it was within the 
authority of the Attorney General to agree that the United States should retire from the case 
upon the terms stated in the stipulation . . . .”); Executive Bus. Media, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Def., 3 F.3d 759, 761–62 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796, 798 
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 571 F.2d 
1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); Smith v. United States, 375 
F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); Halbach v. Markham, 106 
F. Supp. 475, 479–81 (D.N.J. 1952), aff’d, 207 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 
U.S. 933 (1941). 
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The Department of Justice has opined that although “[t]he 
settlement power is sweeping, . . . the Attorney General must still 
exercise her discretion in conformity with her obligation to ‘enforce 
the acts of Congress.’”98 The Office of Legal Counsel has stated that 
to “guide the Attorney General in the exercise of his settlement 
discretion, the 1934 opinions of Attorney General Cummings 
proposed a ‘promote the Government’s best interest, or . . . prevent 
flagrant injustice’ standard.”99 In doing so, however, “the Attorney 
General must, as a general matter, exercise her broad settlement 
discretion in a manner that conforms to the specific statutory limits 
that Congress has imposed upon its exercise.”100 
B. The Potential Problems Created by the Settlement Authority of the 
Department of Justice 
Because the Department of Justice has such broad settlement 
authority, it has the ability to use settlements to circumvent the 
appropriations authority of Congress. The potential for such 
problems exists in both enforcement cases where the Department is 
prosecuting cases against violators of federal statutes and in cases in 
which the Department is defending the United States in lawsuits 
brought against it. 
1. The augmentation problem 
First, the Department is in a position to leverage its enforcement 
litigation authority to obtain settlements that skirt the provisions of 
the Miscellaneous Receipts Act. This first type of problem we can 
generally categorize as the “Augmentation Problem.” The 
Department could not directly receive money from the settlement of 
a case brought against a private party and put that money to its own 
use or benefit. Once the Department receives money in settlement of 
a case, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires that the money be 
deposited in the General Treasury Account and that it not be spent 
until appropriated by Congress. However, the Department of Justice 
has the power to short circuit the Miscellaneous Receipts Act 
 
 98. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of 
Executive Branch Discretion, 1999 WL 1262049, at *9 (Op. Off. Legal Counsel June 15, 
1999) [hereinafter Authority of the United States]. 
 99. 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47, 60 (1982) (citing 38 Op. Att’y Gen. at 102). 
 100. Authority of the United States, supra note 98, at *9. 
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requirement by agreeing to settlement terms that require the violator 
of a federal statute to undertake certain responsibilities or actions 
that might inure to the benefit of the executive branch. For example, 
the Department might require the violator to agree to take an action 
that would relieve an executive agency of the burden of doing so 
itself. That would free up funds that would otherwise have been 
devoted to that purpose for use in some other way. Thus, the 
Department could effectively augment the appropriations of the 
executive branch without running afoul of the technical 
requirements of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act—although creating 
an unconstitutional interference with Congress’s appropriations 
power. 
This is not an imaginary or merely hypothetical possibility. As 
will be discussed in much more detail below, the violators of 
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts 
are frequently required to perform Supplemental Environmental 
Projects (“SEPs”) as part of the settlement of an environmental 
enforcement action against them. These SEPs clearly run the risk of 
treading upon Congress’s appropriations prerogative by requiring a 
polluter to perform a project specified by the executive branch rather 
than pay funds to be deposited in the General Treasury. 
2. The unauthorized grant problem 
The second potential danger to Congress’s appropriations power 
derives from the role of the Department of Justice in defending cases 
on behalf of the federal government. This issue may generally be 
termed as the “Unauthorized Grant Problem.” The potential for this 
type of problem is created when individuals, groups, or even 
countries with a grievance against the United States sue the United 
States government to obtain financial relief. These claimants against 
the United States have a cause that may or may not be just and a 
legal claim that may or may not be meritorious. Unfortunately, the 
worthiness of the cause is not always congruent with the 
meritoriousness of the claim. The government frequently has 
defenses to claims by aggrieved plaintiffs that may prevent recovery 
by plaintiffs whom the administration would like to reward for 
reasons that may be either political or simply related to the belief 
that the plaintiffs should receive compensation notwithstanding the 
legal merit of the claim. In either case, the proper source of relief for 
a claim that is legally questionable is Congress, not the executive 
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branch. The Department of Justice, however, has the power to 
compromise and settle these claims for amounts that may not reflect 
their legal merit but rather the desire of the executive branch to 
compensate plaintiffs whom they deem worthy. This end-run of the 
appropriations process creates access to the Federal Treasury without 
the necessity of persuading the majority in Congress of the 
worthiness of the cause. 
The appeal of using case settlements to further policy objectives 
without regard to the true risk that a judgment might be entered 
against the United States is made infinitely more appealing by the 
availability of the Judgment Fund to pay for any settlement. The 
Judgment Fund is a permanent, indefinite appropriation available to 
pay judgments entered against the United States and settlements of 
litigated or threatened cases.101 Prior to 1956, monetary judgments 
against the United States required Congress to authorize an 
appropriation for the payment of every single judgment.102 For 
obvious reasons this requirement became a significant burden upon 
Congress, so Congress enacted the Judgment Fund Act to provide 
for payment of most judgments against the United States without 
the need for individual appropriations.103 In 1961, the statute was 
amended to allow for payment of compromised settlements out of 
the Judgment Fund as well.104 Even though the original Judgment 
Fund statute included a limit upon payments of $100,000, Congress 
expected that the fund would cover ninety-eight percent or more of 
all judgments rendered against the United States.105 In 1977, 
Congress eliminated the ceiling on payments from the Judgment 
Fund.106 As a result, the Judgment Fund is now available to pay any 
covered judgment or settlement, regardless of the amount. 
 
 101. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2007):  
(a) Necessary amounts are appropriated to pay final judgments, awards, compromise 
settlements, and interest and costs specified in the judgments or otherwise 
authorized by law . . . . 
 102. See Jeffrey Axelrad, What is the Judgment Fund?, ASS’N OF TRIAL LAW. OF AM. 435 
(2004) (“[U]ntil as recently as 1956, monetary judgments against the United States required 
enactment of an appropriations bill individually in order to pay each judgment.”). 
 103. Act of July 27, 1956, ch. 13, 70 Stat. 694. 
 104. Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, 75 Stat. 416 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2414 (2007)). 
 105. See Hearings on Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957, Before Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., pt. 2 at 884 (1956). 
 106. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, § 101, 91 Stat. 61, 
96. 
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The Department of the Treasury107 requires applicants for 
payments from the Judgment Fund to fill out certain forms 
specifying the details of the litigation and citations to the authority 
for payment from the Judgment Fund,108 but, as the Department of 
Treasury itself acknowledges, the actual internal “‘certification’ step 
is largely ministerial, in that Treasury does not review the merits of 
the underlying judgments or settlement.”109 Thus, the determination 
by the Department of Justice on the merits of the settlement is, for 
all intents and purposes, conclusive. 
The appeal of the Judgment Fund is that payments made out of 
it for settlements or judgments in litigated cases are not deducted 
from any agency’s budget. The Department of Treasury has noted 
that: 
The Judgment Fund has no fiscal year limitations, and there is no 
need for Congress to appropriate funds to it annually or otherwise. 
Moreover, disbursements from it are not attributed to or accounted 
for by the agencies whose activities give rise to awards paid. Absent 
a specific statutory requirement, the agency responsible is not 
required to reimburse the Judgment Fund.110 
The Judgment Fund is available to pay for judgments and 
settlements that are “not otherwise provided for,” in other words 
those that cannot legally be paid from any existing appropriation or 
fund.111 Because most agency appropriations for federal executive 
branch agencies are not available to pay judgments or settlements in 
litigated cases, the Judgment Fund is available for the payment of 
most judgments and settlements in cases litigated against the United 
States.112 
 
 107. In 1996, Congress amended the statute to substitute the Secretary of the Treasury 
for the Comptroller General in the requirement for certification of the payment. General 
Accounting Office Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-316, 201, 110 Stat. 3826, 3843. This 
substitution was made in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714 (1986), which ruled that the Comptroller General, as an officer of Congress, could 
not perform executive functions. Id. at 714–715. 
 108. See U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, FIN. MGMT. SERV., Treasury Financial Manual, 
pt. 6, ch. 3100 (2000). 
 109. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, FIN. MGMT. SERV., JUDGMENT FUND: 
BACKGROUND, http://fms.treas.gov/judgefund/background.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2006). 
 110. Id. 
 111. 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (2007). 
 112. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TREAS., supra note 109. 
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Department of Justice officials acknowledge that the existence of 
the Judgment Fund helps to create additional pressure upon the 
Department of Justice to compensate injured plaintiffs even if their 
legal claims are not actually likely to lead to judgments against the 
United States. As Jeffrey Axelrad, the former head of the Torts 
Branch in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, has noted: 
Since agencies do not have a direct fiscal incentive to guard against 
excessive payments from the Judgment Fund, in that payments 
from the Judgment Fund do not reduce agency appropriations 
available for their programs, it is the Attorney General’s especial 
duty to guard against unauthorized or excessive payments. Special 
interests pursued by claimants are noisy and visible (and, with all 
respect, persons with claims against the United States and their 
counsel frequently and very definitely pursue special interests, 
justifiably perhaps, but parochial nonetheless). The incentive to 
yield to the perceived special need du jour is all too evident.113 
Given these incentives, the Department of Justice has a vital and 
unique role in protecting the Judgment Fund and thereby protecting 
Congress’s appropriations authority. 
C. Illustrating the Problems 
1. The augmentation problem: supplemental environmental projects 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s use of Supplemental 
Environmental Projects (“SEPs”) as part of its agreements to settle 
cases against polluters presents a good example of the perils of the 
Augmentation Problem and the benefits of careful legal analysis by 
the Department of Justice in avoiding interference with Congress’s 
appropriations prerogatives.114 A SEP is “an environmentally 
 
 113. Axelrad, supra note 102 (footnote omitted). 
 114. See generally Kathleen Boergers, The EPA’s Supplemental Environmental Projects 
Policy, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 777 (1999); Steven Bonorris, Chelsea Holloway, Annie Lo, & Grace 
Yang, Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Supplemental 
Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185 (2005); David A. 
Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case of Supplemental 
Environmental Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181; Jeff Ganguly, Environmental Remediation 
Through Supplemental Environmental Projects and Creative Negotiation: Renewed Community 
Involvement in Federal Enforcement, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 189 (1998); Edward Lloyd, 
Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used in Citizen Suits to Deter 
Future Violations as Well as to Achieve Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 413 (2004); Laurie Droughton, Note, Supplemental Environmental Projects: 
A Bargain for the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789 (1995); Michael Paul Stevens, 
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beneficial project that a violator voluntarily agrees to perform, in 
addition to actions required to correct the violation(s), as part of an 
enforcement settlement.”115 As further described by the EPA, 
[w]hen volunteering to perform a SEP, a company must show that 
it can and will complete the project, and must provide all funds 
used to finance the project. EPA provides oversight to ensure that 
the company does what it promises to do. EPA, however, does not 
manage or control the funds.116  
Through the SEP program, the EPA has used settlement agreements 
with companies accused of violating environmental laws to 
accomplish a wide range of projects that have environmental or 
public health benefits.117 
The potential Augmentation Problem with the SEP program is 
clear. By requiring a Supplemental Environmental Project as part of a 
settlement agreement with an environmental defendant, the EPA 
(and the Department of Justice acting as counsel on behalf of the 
EPA), reduces the amount of fines or penalties that might be paid by 
the violator in exchange for the agreement to undertake the SEP. 
Such fines or penalties would otherwise be paid into the general 
treasury account pursuant to the Miscellaneous Receipts Act where 
they would be available for congressional appropriation. Such a 
policy arguably evades the requirements of the Miscellaneous 
Receipts Act and almost certainly raises the possibility of the agency 
augmenting its appropriations by requiring an environmental 
defendant to perform projects that might be within the scope of the 
EPA’s duties, thereby leaving more funds available to the EPA for 
other purposes. 
The Comptroller General has, at least on one occasion, 
determined that such a program circumvented Congress’s 
appropriations power. In 1991, John Dingell, the chair of the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, requested an opinion from 
the Comptroller General, as head of the Government Accountability 
 
Note, Limits on Supplemental Environmental Projects in Consent Agreements to Settle Clean 
Water Act Citizen Suits, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 757 (1994). 
 115. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROJECTS 4 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ 
civil/programs/sebrochure.pdf. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 4–37. 
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Office (GAO),118 on the legality of SEPs.119 In particular, 
Representative Dingell asked whether the EPA had the legal 
authority to settle certain mobile source air pollution enforcement 
actions by including SEPs.120 These SEPs would “allow alleged 
violators to fund public awareness and other projects relating to 
automobile air pollution in exchange for reductions of the civil 
penalties assessed against them.”121 The Comptroller General 
determined that the EPA’s proposed settlement was similar to a 
scheme proposed earlier by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
which the Comptroller General had already determined would 
“allow the NRC to circumvent 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) [the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act] and the general rule against 
augmentation of appropriations.”122 The Comptroller General 
emphasized that the Miscellaneous Receipts Act  
[r]equires agencies to deposit money received from any source into 
the Treasury; its purpose is to ensure that Congress retains control 
of the public purse. In our view, the enforcement scheme proposed 
by the NRC would have resulted in an augmentation of NRC’s 
appropriations, allowing it to increase the amount of funds available 
for its nuclear safety research program.123  
The Comptroller General concluded that there was no reason to 
distinguish the EPA’s proposed settlement from the earlier NRC 
proposal.124 
After the EPA protested the Comptroller General’s conclusion, 
the Comptroller General reevaluated its earlier opinion and 
reaffirmed its conclusion.125 The Comptroller General concluded 
that: 
[a]n interpretation of an agency’s prosecutorial authority to allow 
an enforcement scheme involving supplemental projects that go 
 
 118.  The GAO (then known as the General Accounting Office), is an investigative arm 
of the legislative branch. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727–28 (1986); see also infra 
page 45. 
 119. See generally Decs. of the Comp. Gen., B-247155 (1992), 1992 U.S. Comp. Gen. 
LEXIS 1319. 
 120. Id. at *1. 
 121. Id. at *1–2. 
 122. Id. at *7, *3. 
 123. Id. (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Decs. of the Comp. Gen., B-247155.2 (1993), 1993 WL 798227, at *1. 
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beyond remedying the violation in order to carry out other 
statutory goals of the agency, would permit the agency to 
improperly augment its appropriations for those other purposes, in 
circumvention of the congressional appropriations process.126  
Ultimately, in subsequent face-to-face meetings, representative 
Dingell’s staff, the GAO, and the EPA agreed that these GAO 
opinions did not apply to all SEPs, but the legality of the public 
awareness campaigns that were the subject of the opinions remained 
uncertain.127 The EPA and the Department of Justice continued with 
the implementation of the SEP program while both agencies worked 
on a revised SEP policy that would regulate SEPs so as to avoid the 
Augmentation Problem.  
These negotiations ultimately resulted in the issuance of a final 
Supplemental Environmental Projects policy in 1998.128 The SEP 
policy was carefully crafted in order to respect the appropriations 
power of Congress and avoid clashes with the Miscellaneous Receipts 
Act and the anti-augmentation principle of the Constitution. 
Accordingly, the policy sets forth five legal guidelines. First, “[a] 
project cannot be inconsistent with any provision of the underlying 
statutes.”129 This requirement simply ensures that a SEP does not 
run afoul of the statute under which the action is filed. The second 
guideline establishes a nexus requirement that links the SEP with the 
objectives of the environmental statute that provides the basis for the 
enforcement action: 
2. All projects must advance at least one of the objectives of the 
environmental statutes that are the basis of the enforcement action 
and must have adequate nexus. Nexus is the relationship between 
the violation and the proposed project. This relationship exists only 
if: 
a. The project is designed to reduce the likelihood that 
similar violations will occur in the future; or 
 
 126. Id. at *2. 
 127. See Ganguly, supra note 114, at 213–14. 
 128. See Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 
24,796 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 SEP Policy], available at http://frwebgate.access. 
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?IPaddress=frwais.access.gpo.gov&dbname=1998_register&docid 
=98-11881-filed.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 24,798. 
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b. The project reduces the adverse impact to public health or 
the environment to which the violation at issue 
contributes; or 
c. The project reduces the overall risk to public health or the 
environment potentially affected by the violation at issue. 
Nexus is easier to establish if the primary impact of the project is at 
the site where the alleged violation occurred or at a different site in 
the same ecosystem or within the immediate geographic area. Such 
SEPs may have sufficient nexus even if the SEP addresses a different 
pollutant in a different medium. In limited cases, nexus may exist 
even though a project will involve activities outside of the United 
States. The cost of a project is not relevant to whether there is 
adequate nexus.130 
The nexus requirement ensures that the EPA and the 
Department of Justice may not use a potential enforcement action to 
induce the defendant to engage in remediation activities that have no 
connection to the underlying violation. As a result, the agency may 
not trade off funds that might have been extracted in the form of a 
settlement that would be deposited in the Treasury for a project that 
they deemed to be meritorious but, because it has no connection 
with the underlying violation, is an action that should be funded by 
Congress. 
The third requirement states: 
3. EPA may not play any role in managing or controlling funds that 
may be set aside or escrowed for performance of a SEP. Nor may 
EPA retain authority to manage or administer the SEP. EPA may, 
of course, perform oversight to ensure that a project is 
implemented pursuant to the provisions of the settlement and have 
legal recourse if the SEP is not adequately performed.131 
This requirement avoids the obvious Augmentation Problem that 
would result if the EPA retained any control over the SEP funding. 
If the EPA were able to control or manage the funds, it would in 
effect augment the EPA’s budget by giving it additional money over 
which it had authority. This could conceivably raise Miscellaneous 
Receipts Act problems, and it certainly would run afoul of the anti-
augmentation principle of the Constitution. 
 
 130. Id. (citations omitted). 
 131. Id. 
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The fourth requirement states: 
4. The type and scope of each project are defined in the signed 
settlement agreement. This means the “what, where and when” of 
a project are defined by the settlement agreement. Settlements in 
which the defendant/respondent agrees to spend a certain sum of 
money on a project(s) to be defined later (after EPA or the 
Department of Justice signs the settlement agreement) are not 
allowed.132 
This requirement ensures that neither the EPA nor the Department 
of Justice will be able to circumvent the SEP policy by specifying a 
particular project after the settlement agreement is signed. 
The final legal requirement states: 
5.  a. A project cannot be used to satisfy EPA’s statutory 
 obligation or another federal agency’s obligation to perform a 
particular activity. Conversely, if a federal statute prohibits the 
expenditure of federal resources on a particular activity, EPA 
cannot consider projects that would appear to circumvent that 
prohibition. 
b. A project may not provide EPA or any federal agency with 
additional resources to perform a particular activity for which 
Congress has specifically appropriated funds. A project may not 
provide EPA with additional resources to perform a particular 
activity for which Congress has earmarked funds in an 
appropriations committee report. Further, a project cannot be used 
to satisfy EPA’s statutory or earmark obligation, or another federal 
agency’s statutory obligation, to spend funds on a particular 
activity. A project, however, may be related to a particular activity 
for which Congress has specifically appropriated or earmarked 
funds. 
c. A project may not provide additional resources to support 
specific activities performed by EPA employees or EPA contractors. 
For example, if EPA has developed a brochure to help a segment of 
the regulated community comply with environmental 
requirements, a project may not directly, or indirectly, provide 
additional resources to revise, copy or distribute the brochure. 
 
 132. Id.  
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d. A project may not provide a federal grantee with additional 
funds to perform a specific task identified within an assistance 
agreement.133 
Each of these requirements is clearly directed at avoiding 
augmentation problems by prohibiting the use of SEPs to assist any 
project upon which the EPA or any other federal agency might be 
required to spend appropriated funds, which would, as a result, 
increase the funds the federal agency would have available for other 
activities. 
The SEP program illustrates two aspects of the Augmentation 
Problem. First, even in the context of a massive and highly visible 
program, the executive branch has the ability to induce settlements 
that run the risk of creating significant augmentation problems. The 
SEP program involves projects that have had a dollar value of over a 
hundred million dollars in at least one year.134 Yet even a program 
this large and public was able to be implemented in spite of 
opposition from influential members of Congress and the GAO. It 
took careful and responsible efforts from the Department of Justice 
and EPA to ensure that Congress’s appropriations prerogatives 
would be respected. A Department of Justice that was inclined to 
cheat on these standards in order to dodge Congress’s 
appropriations authority would undoubtedly be able to avoid 
detection or resist any efforts to constrain its ability to evade 
Congress’s power of the purse. 
Second, Congress necessarily relies on the good faith of the 
Department of Justice in settling cases on terms that respect its 
constitutional authority. The SEP policy is a good example of how 
the Department of Justice ought to approach the Augmentation 
Problem presented by case settlements so as to honor the 
Constitution and Congress’s proper role in controlling the 
appropriations process. It is not hard to imagine, however, that a 
Department of Justice oriented toward an advocacy model, a more 
aggressive approach to executive prerogative, and the pursuit of the 
administration’s own policy ends would be able to take significant 
advantage of its litigation authority to undermine and usurp 
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. If the decision makers in the 
Department of Justice are not committed to fair and independent 
 
 133. Id. at 24,798–99 (citations omitted). 
 134. See Dana, supra note 114, at 1189. 
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analysis of the constitutional issues raised by these kinds of 
settlement practices, the constitutional separation of powers can be 
damaged in ways that are as significant, even if less dramatic, than 
the more visible and publicized matters relating to assertion of 
national security powers. 
2. The unauthorized grant problem: case studies 
In cases in which the Department of Justice is defending claims 
against the United States, the Department may be tempted to offer 
more compensation to the plaintiffs than would be warranted by an 
independent assessment of the litigation risk presented by plaintiffs’ 
claims. The Department may wish to reward litigants who are 
political allies or it may have a sincere belief that the moral claims of 
the plaintiffs deserve to be compensated, notwithstanding the 
defenses the United States may have against the legal claims. Below, 
this article considers a number of actual cases defended by the 
Department of Justice to illustrate the kind of tug that the 
Department of Justice officials may feel when settling cases brought 
against the United States. 
a. The Black Farmers case. The case famously known as the Black 
Farmers case presents an example of how the settlement power 
might be abused for political reasons. In the summer of 1997, a 
group of black farmers filed a class action suit against the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in federal district court in 
Washington, D.C.135 The lawsuit was filed on behalf of 641 farmers 
who had filed discrimination complaints with the USDA over the 
previous fifteen years.136 The plaintiffs claimed that the Department 
of Agriculture had discriminated against them on the basis of their 
race by denying them subsidized agricultural loans and then by 
unfairly refusing to investigate their discrimination complaints after 
the loans were denied.137 
The farmers presented a compelling factual claim, and the 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Justice, which 
was representing the Department of Agriculture in the litigation, 
moved quickly to settle the litigation and provide relief to the 
 
 135. See Michael A. Fletcher, USDA Accused of Ignoring Discrimination Complaint; 
Black Farmers Also Allege Departmental Bias, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1997, at A3. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
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plaintiffs.138 The lawsuit drew attention not only from the Secretary 
of Agriculture, but from President Clinton himself, who met 
personally with members of the plaintiff class.139 The plaintiffs left 
the meeting with support from President Clinton to obtain a rapid 
settlement of their litigation.140 
The problem that emerged in the litigation, however, was that 
the applicable discrimination statutes had a two-year statute of 
limitations, which would have left the vast majority of farmers 
without relief.141 In order to settle the litigation, the Associate 
Attorney General asked the Office of Legal Counsel for advice 
concerning whether the department could waive the two-year statute 
of limitations that applied to claims under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act.142 At that point, Congress’s appropriation 
prerogatives came into play because only Congress may waive 
statutes of limitations in cases filed against the government. As the 
OLC opinion noted, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity 
precludes suit against the United States without the consent of 
Congress, and the terms of its consent define the extent of a court’s 
jurisdiction.”143 As a corollary of this rule, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that “[w]hen waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, 
the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of 
sovereign immunity.”144 As a result, the OLC opinion concluded 
that, “[b]ecause the terms of consent are established by Congress, 
modifying the terms of consent requires legislative action. Thus the 
Attorney General cannot waive the statute of limitations in the 
litigation or in the compromise of these pending claims.”145 
 
 138. Associated Press, Black Farmers, Clinton to Meet Today Over Bias, BALTIMORE SUN, 
Dec. 17, 1997, at 4.A. 
 139. See Peter Hardin, $600 Million for Farmers Planned; Meeting with Clinton ‘Forward 
Movement’, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 1997, at A1. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Curt Anderson, As Bias Claims Blocked, White House Seeks Waiver For Black 
Farmers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 9, 1998, at A12. 
 142. See Statute of Limitations and Settlement of Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
Discrimination Claims Against the Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Statute of 
Limitations and Settlement], 22 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 11 (1998), 1998 OLC LEXIS 43, at 
*1. 
 143. Id. at *3; see also United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986). 
 144. Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). 
 145. Statute of Limitations and Settlement, supra note 142, 1998 OLC LEXIS, at *3 
(citations omitted). 
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The OLC memorandum then responded to a suggestion from 
the Department of Agriculture that, even if it were not authorized to 
settle Equal Credit and Opportunity Act claims when the statute of 
limitations had elapsed, it could make administrative settlements of 
discrimination claims even in the absence of a lawsuit.146 A previous 
OLC opinion concluded that, consistent with the Purpose Statute,147 
the Secretary of Agriculture could award monetary relief in 
administrative settlements or prelitigation equal credit claims if a 
court could award such relief in an action brought under the act.148 
Moreover, the FTC, which was statutorily authorized to investigate 
and prosecute equal credit opportunity act claims, had authorized 
the Department of Agriculture to investigate equal credit claims and 
provide compensation for those claims prior to litigation.149 The 
OLC opinion concluded, however, that because  
USDA’s authority to use existing appropriations to pay 
administrative ECOA claims depends upon the existence of a viable 
civil action that could be brought by the aggrieved claimant . . . 
ECOA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is valid only where a claim is 
filed before the expiration of the limitations period . . . and the 
agency cannot rely on the existence of a viable ECOA claim as a 
basis for extending appropriated funds to pay compensatory 
damages as part of an administrative settlement.150 
The first OLC opinion was confirmed in a later opinion. This 
second opinion addressed whether the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs151 altered or in any way 
undermined the principle that the statute of limitations, in claims 
against the federal government, is conditioned upon the waiver of 
sovereign immunity that may not be altered or waived absent 
congressional action.152 The second opinion goes into greater detail 
about the extent of Congress’s control over the waiver of statutes of 
 
 146. Id. at *5. 
 147. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2000) (providing that a federal agency may spend funds only 
on the objects for which they were appropriated). 
 148. Statute of Limitations and Settlement, supra note 142, at *10.  
 149. Id. at *4. 
 150. Id. (citations omitted). 
 151. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
 152. See Waiver of Statutes of Limitations in Connection with Claims Against the 
Department of Agriculture, 22 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 127 (1998), 1998 OLC LEXIS 6, at 
*1. 
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limitations in suits against the government. Congress’s control of 
waiver is rooted in the separation of powers generally, and more 
specifically in its appropriations authority: “Congress’s exclusive 
authority over the terms upon which the United States may be sued 
is rooted in Congress’s plenary authority over the appropriation of 
federal funds.”153  
OLC’s conclusion was supported by clear Supreme Court 
precedent. For example, in Munro v. United States,154 the plaintiff 
had a good argument that his failure to file within the statute of 
limitations was induced by the federal government because he was 
erroneously advised that service of process would toll the applicable 
statute of limitations.155 The Supreme Court, however, held that the 
U.S. Attorney “had no power to waive conditions or limitations 
imposed by statute in respect of suits against the United States.”156 
In this case, the Supreme Court cited Finn v. United States,157 in 
which the Supreme Court ruled that if a federal statute of limitations 
creates a “condition or qualification of the right to a judgment 
against the United States,”158 the statute of limitations is a 
nonwaivable bar against any judgment against the United States, 
unless Congress has “conferred authority upon any of [the 
government’s] officers to waive the limitation imposed by statute.”159 
As a result of the Department’s decision to adhere to the 
conclusions of the OLC opinions, the Clinton Administration went 
to Congress to seek legislation that would waive the two-year statute 
of limitations.160 Although the Department took some political heat 
for proceeding in this manner, it respected Congress’s appropriations 
power and left it up to Congress to adopt the appropriate waiver.161 
Ultimately, Congress did adopt a provision in an appropriations bill 
that extended the statute of limitations from two years to 
seventeen.162 
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After passage of the statutory extension of the time within which 
to file suit, the Department of Justice settled the case by agreeing to 
pay hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate the black farmers 
who were the victims of the USDA’s discriminatory loan policies.163 
This settlement was ultimately approved by the district judge on 
terms that gave a fixed payment to most of the plaintiffs and allowed 
a smaller number with better documented proof of damages to go 
before an independent arbitrator to prove the amount of loss they 
had suffered.164 Eventually, the government paid out more than 
$600 million dollars under the terms of the settlement agreement.165 
The Black Farmers case is a good example of how the settlement 
process ought to proceed, with due respect given to Congress’s 
appropriations authority. Rather than leaping over or subverting the 
limitations imposed by Congress’s control over the circumstances in 
which money judgments may be obtained against the United States, 
the Department of Justice went to Congress for the appropriate 
authority before it settled the case. For this result to take place, 
however, there had to be a commitment to seek neutral legal advice 
on the difficult questions of settlement authority as well as a 
commitment to follow that advice once it was given. 
 b. The Japanese Latin Americans case. Most Americans are 
familiar with the detention of Japanese Americans during World War 
II in American internment camps, an internment notoriously upheld 
in Korematsu v. United States.166 This story is a tragic episode in the 
history of America’s treatment of racial minorities as well as the 
Court’s inability to protect vulnerable groups from oppression by the 
majority. Congress attempted to bring some sort of closure to this 
sad tale of injustice by adopting the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,167 
 
 163. See David Firestone, Agriculture Dept. to Settle Lawsuit by Black Farmers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1999, at A1. 
 164. Editorial, Judge Approves Settlement for Black Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, 
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 165. See Carol McKay, Farmer Class Action Victory Slowing Down, FED. LAW., Jan. 2003, 
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which offered a formal apology to the Japanese Americans along 
with $20,000 to each Japanese American internee.168 
Few, however, are familiar with the country’s internment of 
Japanese Latin Americans, who were taken from Latin American 
countries, principally Peru, and transported to the United States 
where they were held in internment camps throughout the war.169 
The detention of these Japanese Latin Americans derived from a 
conference of the foreign ministers of North and South America that 
convened in Rio De Janeiro in January 1942.170 These ministers 
adopted a number of resolutions at the conference, including one 
that advocated the “[i]nternment of dangerous Axis agents and 
nationals for the duration of the emergency.”171 After the United 
States agreed to pay for the transportation and detention of these 
Japanese Latin Americans, over one dozen Latin American countries 
sent internees to the United States.172 By the time the last ship 
transporting Japanese Peruvians arrived in the United States on 
October 21, 1944, over 2000 Latin Americans had been taken from 
their homes and imprisoned in United States’ internment camps.173 
These Japanese Latin Americans were kept not only because of the 
supposed national security threat they posed (although what threat 
they posed in Peru and other Latin American countries was highly 
questionable), but also to provide the United States with individuals 
who might be swapped for Americans being held in Japanese 
custody.174 Ultimately, between November 1945 and February 1946 
the United States deported between 1400 to 1700 Japanese Latin 
 
 168. Id. at § 1; § 105(a)(1). 
 169. See generally C. HARVEY GARDINER, PAWNS IN A TRIANGLE OF HATE: THE 
PERUVIAN JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES (1981); HIGASHIDE SEIICHI, ADIOS TO TEARS: 
THE MEMOIRS OF A JAPANESE-PERUVIAN INTERNEE IN U.S. CONCENTRATION CAMPS 
(1994); Corey Takahashi, The Other Japanese American Internment, A. MAGAZINE, Sept. 30, 
1997, at 40; Julie Tamaki, An Enduring Indignity: Japanese Latin Americans Interned During 
War Still Seek Redress, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at B1. 
 170. See GARDINER, supra note 169, at 16–17. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS 59 (1996). 
 173. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law 
in the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians—A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV. 275, 
290 (1998). 
 174. Id. at 293–94. 
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Americans to Japan.175 Others were forced to reside indefinitely in 
the United States.176 
The congressional effort to provide compensation to those 
interned during World War II began in 1979 with the creation of 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians, which Congress created to investigate the internments and 
to recommend what, if any, compensation should be provided to the 
wartime internees.177 After holding a number of public hearings, the 
commission recommended (1) compensatory payments of $20,000 
to the approximately 60,000 surviving internees; (2) a formal 
apology by the United States government to all internees; and (3) a 
presidential pardon for those Japanese Americans convicted of 
curfew violations.178 Ultimately, Congress adopted the Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988.179 Although previous versions of the bill had required 
compensation recipients to be citizens or permanent residents of the 
United States at the time the Act was passed, the conference 
committee included a requirement that to be eligible for 
compensation individuals must have been either U.S. citizens or 
permanent residents at the time of their internment.180 The result 
was that Japanese Latin American internees were excluded from the 
purview of the Act since they were not U.S. citizens or permanent 
residents, not having lived in the United States prior to internment 
and having been transported into the United States for the purpose 
of internment only.  
In 1996, the Japanese Latin American internees filed a class-
action suit, Mochizuki v. United States,181 in which they demanded 
the same compensation rights that the 1988 Civil Liberties Act 
granted to Japanese Americans.182 The lawsuit alleged that the failure 
 
 175. See WEGLYN, supra note 172, at 64 n.28. 
 176. Lika C. Miyake, Note, Forsaken and Forgotten: The Internment of Japanese Peruvians 
During World War II, 9 ASIAN L.J. 163, 177–179 (2002); see also Manjusha P. Kulkarni, 
Note, Application of the Civil Liberties Act to Japanese Peruvians: Seeking Redress for 
Deportation and Internment Conducted by the United States Government During World War II, 
5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 309, 316 (1996). 
 177. See generally COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERMENT OF 
CIVILIANS: PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982). 
 178. Id. at xxiii. 
 179. See supra note 167.  
 180. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-785, at 8–9 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). 
 181. Mochizuki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97, 97 (1999). 
 182. See Tim Golden, Group Seeks Reparations as Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, 
at A18. 
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to include Japanese Latin Americans in the compensation fund 
enacted by the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 deprived the Japanese 
Latin Americans of equal protection under the laws.183 The suit was 
defended by the federal programs branch of the Civil Division of the 
Department of Justice, and ultimately the plaintiffs and the 
government agreed upon a settlement that offered a payment of 
$5000 to each of the eligible Japanese Latin American plaintiffs.184 
This settlement was ultimately approved by the Chief Judge of the 
United States Court of Federal Claims,185 who, in approving the 
settlement of the litigation, spoke movingly about the plight of the 
plaintiffs: 
The court approves the settlement of this case based upon the 
moving and eloquent testimony of several of the class members as 
well as plaintiffs’ fine lawyers. The court believes those class 
members’ statements provide valuable insight into the tragic 
experiences of Latin Americans of Japanese descent who were 
interned here during World War II.186 
This all sounds like a reasonable, if not altogether satisfying, 
conclusion to the tragic saga of the Japanese Latin Americans. But 
not according to John Miller, who wrote in the National Review 
that the Department of Justice had “gamed” the system by agreeing 
to the settlement with Japanese Latin Americans.187 Miller reported 
that in October 1997, sixty-five members of Congress had sent a 
letter to President Clinton that urged the President to provide the 
same $20,000 compensatory payment to Japanese Latin Americans 
as was being paid to Japanese Americans under the terms of the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988.188 Clinton replied in January of 1998 that he 
regretted that it was not “within my authority” to compensate 
Japanese Latin Americans under the Act.189 Shortly after Clinton’s 
comment, the Department of Justice filed a brief with the Court of 
Federal Claims, which was hearing the Mochizuki case, in which it 
 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Dara Akiko Tom, US Settles Suit Over Wartime Internments, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 13, 1998, at A3; U.S. Will Pay Reparations to Former Latin American Internees, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 1998, at A19. 
 185. See Mochizuki, 43 Fed. Cl. at 97. 
 186. Id. 
 187. John J. Miller, Intern Problem, NAT’L REV., May 3, 1999, at 24. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. 
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stated that “‘[t]he plain language of the Act leaves no room for 
doubt that (ACLU) plaintiffs are ineligible for redress payments.’”190 
Miller then alleged that political appointees in the Department of 
Justice suggested a settlement of $5,000 per plaintiff.191 Miller 
claimed that the settlement was approved by the Deputy Attorney 
General notwithstanding a dissent from the General Counsel of the 
Justice Management Division, who wrote: “‘I see virtually no 
litigative risk. Accordingly I cannot advise an accountable officer to 
certify the settlement payments you propose to make.’”192 Miller also 
quotes career officials as stating, “‘There was no way we were going 
to go down . . . . We had an airtight case, and the lawsuit would 
have been dismissed.’”193  
Although the case for compensation of Japanese Americans is 
truly compelling, if the Japanese Latin Americans were, as seems to 
be the case, ineligible for compensation under the Civil Liberties 
Act, then the decision to settle for an amount that did not reflect the 
litigation risk of the Mochizuki lawsuit amounted to a grant of 
money unauthorized by the Congress.194 Indeed it is the compelling 
nature of the plaintiffs’ moral claim that tests the resolve of the 
Department of Justice to settle cases based upon the applicable law 
and leave the policy judgments up to Congress in whose hands the 
appropriations power constitutionally lies.195 As of yet, however, 
Congress has not passed legislation to establish a separate fund to 
compensate the Japanese Latin American internees in the same 
manner as Japanese Americans.196  
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 25. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 24. 
 194.  The settlement agreement provided that settlement funds were to be paid out of 
the fund established for compensating Japanese Americans. Ultimately, however, this fund was 
exhausted, and the Department of Justice had to fund the remaining $4.3 million of the 
settlement by an appropriation “[b]uried deep inside the supplemental appropriations bill.” Id. 
By that point, Congress had little choice but to complete the settlement payout. 
 195. Indeed, Congress has been presented with a bill titled “The Wartime Parity and 
Justice Act” which calls for an official apology and a $20,000 payment to each Japanese Latin 
American interned in the United States during World War II. See Connie Kang, Interned 
Japanese-Latin Americans Seek Redress, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2000, at B2. 
 196. See Tim Johnson, Deportation Affected Ethnic Japanese in at Least 12 Latin 
Countries, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 2003, available at http:// 
www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-relations/japanese.htm. 
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c. The sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. In the 1980s, the U.S. 
Government approved a proposed contract between General 
Dynamics Corporation and Pakistan for the sale of twenty-eight F-
16 fighter jets.197 Pakistan ultimately paid $658 million for the 
twenty-eight planes, but the planes were never delivered because a 
statute known as the Pressler Amendment (named for Senator Larry 
Pressler of South Dakota) barred all United States military and 
economic assistance to a country if the President stated that he was 
unable to certify that the country was not developing nuclear 
weapons.198 In 1990, President Bush notified Congress that he was 
unable to certify that Pakistan had not developed nuclear weapons.199 
As a result, Pakistan did not receive delivery of any of the F-16 
jets.200 Ultimately, this impasse became a major stumbling block in 
relations between Pakistan and the United States.201 The Pressler 
Amendment foreclosed the possibility of Pakistan obtaining the jets, 
while contractual provisions prevented Pakistan from obtaining a 
refund of the money it had paid for the jets.  
The Clinton Administration found a solution for this standoff by 
resorting to the Judgment Fund. After Pakistan had threatened to 
sue the United States over the nondelivery of the jets, the 
administration reached an agreement with Pakistan under which 
Pakistan would be paid $324,600,000 in cash from the Judgment 
Fund and receive an additional $142,300,000 from other sources as 
compensation for the twenty-eight F-16s that Pakistan had paid for 
in 1989 but had never received.202 News reports at the time noted 
that using the settlement of a potential claim as a means for 
obtaining funds from the Judgment Fund allowed the administration 
to avoid seeking an appropriation from Congress.203 The reports also 
indicated that “lawmakers probably would have refused such a 
request. Many members believe Pakistan created the problem by 
 
 197. See Thomas W. Lippman, Compromise Proposed on Fighter Sale to Pakistan, WASH. 
POST, May 24, 1995, at A8. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  
 201. See generally Brian McGrory, US Looks for a Carrot to Dissuade Pakistan from 
Answering Rival, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 1998, at A27. 
 202. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Pays Pakistan for F-16s Withheld Over Nuclear Issue, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1999, at A17 [hereinafter Lippman, Nuclear Issue]; U.S. to Pay Pakistan 
Back for Undelivered Jets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at A19. 
 203. See Lippman Nuclear Issue, supra note 205, at A17. 
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deceiving Congress about its nuclear intentions and by paying for 
the planes, knowing that delivery might be blocked under a 1985 
law known as the Pressler Amendment.”204 Some sources at the time 
suggested that the settlement did not accurately reflect litigation risk, 
but that it was simply a way to get around the need to go to 
Congress for the funds. 
Again, it is unclear whether and to what extent political officials 
in the Department of Justice may have influenced the settlement of 
the F-16 case in order to further the political and international 
relations agenda of the administration. At the very least, it points out 
the potential use and the incentive to use the Judgment Fund in 
order to avoid having to seek congressional appropriations. As long 
as the Department of Justice has control over the settlement of 
litigation, it has the power to evade Congress’s constitutional 
appropriations authority. Thus, independent and neutral judgment 
with respect to the settlement of litigation is just as important in 
preserving Congress’s prerogatives as advice to the President on 
national security issues. 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESS’S APPROPRIATIONS 
PREROGATIVE 
The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution and the statutes 
promulgated by Congress to protect its appropriations authority are 
not self-enforcing. Someone has to be responsible for ensuring that 
executive branch agencies follow the requirements of the 
Constitution and federal appropriations statutes. Each of the three 
branches may play some role in enforcing Congress’s appropriations 
prerogative, but there are distinct limitations on the ability of both 
the judicial and legislative branches to ensure that Congress’s rights 
are protected. Unfortunately, neither the Augmentation Problem 
nor the Unauthorized Grant Problem can be supervised effectively 
by any branch of government other than the executive and by any 
part of the executive branch other than the Department of Justice. 
As a result, for the reasons discussed below, the department is the 
only effective check on itself and therefore the only effective defender 
of Congress’s appropriations prerogative in these types of situations. 
Only an honest and detached analysis of the issues raised by these 
 
 204. Id. 
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kinds of cases will protect the public treasury from being raided 
without any congressional approval. 
A. The Judicial Branch 
The judicial branch has on a number of occasions enforced 
appropriations restrictions and other congressional limitations on 
spending authority.205 In other cases, however, courts have refrained 
from intervening on justiciability grounds in disputes about the 
executive’s spending authority and alleged violations of congressional 
restrictions on appropriations.206 Moreover, even “where private 
parties would have standing to challenge executive compliance with 
most federal appropriation limitations, they may choose not to do 
so” because they may be the beneficiaries of the failure to comply 
with the restriction.207 In short, because the judicial branch is 
dependent upon private litigants presenting them with litigable and 
justiciable cases or controversies, the courts are ill-equipped to serve 
the role of enforcers of Congress’s appropriations prerogatives. At 
best, the courts may be able to provide general guidelines on the 
scope of Congress’s appropriations power. They are ill-suited, 
however, for day-to-day monitoring of compliance with the 
Appropriations Clause and the statutory regime enforcing it. 
 
 205. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1978) (holding that 
TVA appropriations were subject to limitations originating from the Endangered Species Act); 
Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Donovan, 746 
F.2d 855, 859–63 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that appropriations legislation permitted the 
Secretary of Labor to distribute lump-sum appropriations among selected training programs), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1510–
11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (upholding the justiciability of a claim that the President had 
permissibly violated Congress’s appropriations authority by training Salvadorian soldiers in 
Honduras), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 
F.2d 40, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that Secretary of Transportation had violated 
restrictions in appropriations legislation). 
 206. See, e.g., Phelps v. Reagan, 812 F.2d 1293, 1294 (10th Cir. 1987) (denying 
taxpayer standing to challenge the use of appropriated funds for the appointment of an 
ambassador to the Vatican); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(holding that congressman’s challenge to military assistance to El Salvador is nonjusticiable), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam) (declining to entertain challenge to President’s expenditure of appropriated funds in 
support of Israel because it was a nonjusticiable political question), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 
(1975). 
 207. See Stith, supra note 17, at 1387 (citations omitted). 
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B. The Legislative Branch 
Enforcement through the legislative branch may come from 
congressional committees or investigations and opinions issued by 
the Government Accountability Office on appropriations-related 
matters. 
1. Enforcement by congressional committees 
Congress has two basic methods for enforcing its appropriations 
prerogatives. First, it may conduct oversight and investigations 
through its own committees to determine whether the executive 
branch is complying with appropriations statutes. Most of this 
oversight is routinely conducted by the appropriations committees 
and the committees with the specific responsibility for particular 
executive branch departments, such as the Armed Services 
Committee’s oversight over Pentagon spending. Congress has 
initiated special investigations of particularly egregious violations of 
its appropriations authority, such as in response to the Iran-Contra 
affair,208 but congressional oversight, however diligent, cannot begin 
to keep track of the innumerable appropriations issues dealt with by 
the executive branch agencies. For this responsibility, Congress relies 
upon the Comptroller General of the United States and the GAO. 
2. The Government Accountability Office 
The GAO was established as the General Accounting Office209 as 
a result of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.210 Prior to the 
enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act, auditing and financial 
review functions of the federal government were carried out by the 
Department of the Treasury.211 Because of the perceived 
shortcomings of the Treasury’s audits of executive branch financial 
transactions,  
 
 208. See Hearings, supra note 20. 
 209. Effective July 7, 2004, the GAO’s legal name was changed to the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-271, 118 Stat. 811. 
 210. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 23 (codified as 31 
U.S.C. § 702 (2000)). 
 211. See RICHARD E. BROWN, THE GAO: UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER 10 (1970). 
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the Budget and Accounting Act . . . transferred audit 
responsibilities from the Treasury Department . . . to the GAO . . . 
[and] broadened the scope of audit work by requiring the 
comptroller general to investigate all matters relating to the receipt, 
disbursement, and application of public funds and to recommend 
measures that might lead to greater economy in public 
expenditure.212  
In addition, the Act stated that the Comptroller General shall 
“make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either 
House of Congress or by any committee of either House having 
jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations, or expenditures.”213 The 
Act also required the Comptroller General to “specially report to 
Congress every expenditure or contract made by any department or 
establishment in any year in violation of law.”214 Thus, the GAO has 
primary responsibility for ensuring that Congress’s exclusive 
appropriations authority is preserved.215 
The Comptroller General is appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate for a term of fifteen years and is 
removable by joint resolution of Congress, a provision which the 
Supreme Court has determined makes the Comptroller General an 
officer of Congress rather than the Executive.216 Because the 
Comptroller General is an officer of Congress, the Court ruled that 
it was unconstitutional for Congress to vest in the Comptroller 
General executive authority.217 As a result of the Court’s decision in 
Bowsher, the GAO has no binding authority over executive branch 
agencies. Instead, the Department of Justice has concluded that the 
GAO’s opinions and audits are advisory only.218 Thus, although the 
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GAO’s decisions are usually followed by the executive branch,219 the 
Department of Justice feels free to disagree and follow its own 
interpretation of the applicable law. 
An example of such an instance arose in connection with the 
Bush Administration’s controversial use of video news releases 
without disclosing that the government was the source of the news 
releases.220 The GAO issued an opinion in which it concluded that 
the news releases were not authorized by the applicable 
appropriations statutes and that the misuse of funds by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) constituted a 
violation of the Antideficiency Act.221 The Office of Legal Counsel, 
however, concluded otherwise and, in an opinion for the General 
Counsel of HHS, ruled that HHS was not bound by the GAO 
opinion.222 The OLC opinion generated a storm of protest,223 and, 
ultimately, Congress passed an appropriations rider to prevent the 
government from using video news releases without disclosing their 
source.224 This is, however, the rarest of cases in which an issue is so 
publicly controversial that Congress is willing and able to enact a 
statute to reverse the OLC’s interpretation of a statute. Much more 
frequently, the parties remain at odds, and the executive branch 
follows the Department’s ruling on the law.225  
Thus, GAO provides a weak check on the Department of 
Justice’s authority. In the vast majority of cases, the settlement of the 
Department’s cases never comes to the attention of GAO. In the 
cases in which they do, the Department feels free to ignore GAO’s 
 
 219. The GAO’s recommendations are usually followed because it is required by statute 
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 221. See Matter of: Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare 
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 224. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on 
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Nov. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 2222386. 
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interpretations of the statutes designed to enforce Congress’s 
appropriations prerogatives. 
C. Executive Branch Enforcement of Congress’s Appropriations 
Authority 
The gaps in the ability of the judicial and legislative branches’ 
ability to oversee the executive’s compliance with Congress’s 
appropriations authority means that ultimately the executive branch 
is responsible for protecting Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. 
The executive, and, in particular, the Department of Justice, must 
find a way to establish an institutional culture that respects 
Congress’s appropriations power in the course of handling litigation 
on behalf of the United States. This conclusion has a number of 
implications for scholars who are considering possible institutional 
changes at the Department of Justice as well as for executive officials 
who wish to keep the Department within constitutional bounds. 
First, any scholarly discussion of the Department’s role within 
the executive branch, and the need for independence from 
presidential or political control, must surely take into account the 
opinion writing function of the Office of Legal Counsel and the 
litigating function in the Supreme Court of the Solicitor General’s 
office. But it must also take into account the potential for evasion of 
Congress’s appropriations power inherent in the Department’s 
control over litigation on behalf of the United States Government. 
The Department of Justice’s power to settle cases on its own terms 
presents temptations to circumvent the appropriations process in 
both the prosecution of cases against private defendants and in the 
defense of cases brought against the federal government. Any 
normative discussion of the role played by the Justice Department’s 
lawyers must take into account these real-life temptations and 
provide for the protection of Congress’s constitutional prerogative. 
Second, to the extent that these issues involve the role of the 
Office of Legal Counsel, which is frequently called upon to give 
advice on appropriations related issues and the legality of 
settlements, the Office should turn for guidance to a set of 
foundational principles recently proposed by a number of former 
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appointees and attorneys from the Office.226 The ten principles set 
forth in this proposal provide a foundation for approaching all issues 
presented to the OLC, but are particularly appropriate in connection 
with the appropriations issues discussed above. In particular, the first 
proposed principle is particularly relevant to this issue:  
When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive 
branch action, OLC should provide an accurate and honest 
appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the 
administration’s pursuit of desired policies. The advocacy model of 
lawyering, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal arguments 
to support their clients’ desired actions, inadequately promotes the 
President’s constitutional obligation to ensure the legality of 
executive action.227 
This model of OLC lawyering does not require the OLC lawyer 
to act only as a judge, without regard to the interests of the office’s 
client, but rather, as Randolph Moss has suggested, the  
executive branch lawyer should work within the framework and 
tradition of executive branch legal interpretation and seek ways to 
further the legal and policy goals of the administration he serves. 
He should do so, however, within the framework of the best view 
of the law and, in that sense should take the obligation neutrally to 
interpret the law as seriously as a court.228 
Several other principles also provide necessary guidance in the 
context of the appropriations issues discussed above. For example, 
principle number two counsels that the “OLC’s advice should be 
thorough and forthright, and it should reflect all legal constraints, 
including the constitutional authorities of the coordinate branches of 
the federal government—the courts and Congress—and 
constitutional limits on the exercise of governmental power.”229 The 
important element of this principle is that the constitutional 
obligation of the President and his subordinates in the Office of 
Legal Counsel is to defend the entire Constitution, not just the 
executive powers granted by Article II. Although OLC frequently 
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provides analysis for the President on disputed issues such as 
executive privilege and congressional oversight of the executive 
branch, the Office nevertheless has the responsibility for ensuring 
that Congress’s constitutional prerogatives are respected as well. 
This conclusion is particularly true when, as is the case with the 
Justice Department’s settlement authority, the Department’s actions 
are essentially unreviewable. The third of the proposed OLC 
principles speaks to this concern: “OLC’s obligation to counsel 
compliance with the law, and the insufficiency of the advocacy 
model, pertain with special force in circumstances where OLC’s 
advice is unlikely to be subject to review by the courts.”230 OLC’s 
prior approach, which “would equate ‘lawful’ with ‘likely to escape 
judicial condemnation,’” ill serves “the President’s constitutional 
duty by failing to describe all legal constraints and by appearing to 
condone unlawful action as long as the President could, in a sense, 
get away with it.”231 The OLC can play an important role in ensuring 
that Congress’s constitutional authority is respected during the 
litigation settlement process, but in order to do so, the office must 
be committed to providing a fair analysis of the issues presented by 
difficult cases where there may be a strong pull to reach a settlement 
result that furthers the administration’s political and policy goals.232 
D. Principles to Guide the Settlement of Cases by the  
Department of Justice 
The proposed principles to guide the Office of Legal Counsel 
also suggest a model that might be emulated in connection with the 
issues presented by the Justice Department’s settlement of litigation. 
These proposed principles borrow in part from the Supplemental 
Environmental Project (“SEP”) program guidelines in order to 
address the Augmentation Problem and include additional principles 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.  
 232. It is, of course, also important for OLC to do what it can to ensure that it will be 
consulted on these difficult issues. Hence the ninth of the proposed principles states: “OLC 
should strive to maintain good working relationships with its client agencies, and especially the 
White House Counsel’s Office, to help ensure that OLC is consulted, before the fact, 
regarding any and all substantial executive branch action of questionable legality.” Id. Thus, in 
cases where the authority to settle is questionable or implicates Congress’s appropriations 
prerogative (such as the Black Farmer’s case), it is essential for OLC to remain involved in the 
process and to provide advice that respects the Constitution’s division of authority between the 
executive and legislative branches. 
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to address the Unauthorized Grant problem. The underlying 
protections offered by the proposed principles for OLC guidance 
and the SEP program would also protect against circumvention of 
Congress’s appropriations power in Department of Justice settlement 
cases. The following nine principles are inspired by the proposed 
OLC principles and the SEP guidelines. 
In cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice: 
1.  A settlement may not provide the Department of Justice or any 
federal agency with resources to increase the funds available for 
expenditure by the agency or to perform a function for which 
Congress has appropriated funds. 
This guideline sets forth the basic anti-augmentation principle, 
which prevents a federal agency from effectively enlarging its own 
budget by having a defendant make resources available to a federal 
agency in lieu of fines that would otherwise be paid into the Federal 
Treasury.  
2. A settlement may not require the defendant to perform actions 
that will satisfy a federal agency’s responsibility to perform the 
particular action. 
This guideline prevents the Justice Department from evading the 
anti-augmentation principle by passing off an agency’s statutory 
duties to a defendant in order to make more funds available for other 
projects. 
3. Neither the Department nor any federal agency may control or 
manage any funds that are paid by the defendant to settle the 
litigation. 
This guideline avoids another evasion of the anti-augmentation 
principle by preventing the Department of Justice from retaining 
control over funds that may technically remain in the hands of the 
defendant. Such a settlement technique might meet the letter of the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act because the money would not technically 
be paid to the government, but it would contravene the anti-
augmentation principle by effectively giving the agency control over 
more funds than Congress appropriated, presumably at the price of a 
higher settlement that would have been paid into the Treasury. 
4. A settlement may not require the defendant to perform any 
actions that do not have a nexus to the alleged violation of the law.  
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This guideline ensures that the Justice Department does not 
utilize a settlement to get the offender to perform the Department’s 
idea of a good work that does not have any connection with the 
underlying subject of the suit. Trading off possible fine payments for 
remedial action that is connected with the violation is within the 
generally accepted enforcement authority of the executive branch. If, 
however, there is no connection between remedial action and the 
alleged violation, the Department will have traded off the payment of 
potential fines for an action that cannot be considered remedial of 
the violation and therefore is akin to an augmentation of the 
Department’s budget. 
5. A settlement may not be inconsistent with a provision of the 
statutes that authorize the case.  
This guideline ensures that any settlement terms reflect the 
requirements of the statutes under which the Department of Justice 
has prosecuted the alleged violator of federal law. Even if the 
Department complies with all of the Appropriations Clause related 
requirements of the Settlement Principles, the Department must still 
adhere to any requirements that are specific to the law under which 
the enforcement action has been brought. 
In cases defended by the Department of Justice: 
6. A case may not be settled with money to be paid out of the 
Judgment Fund on terms that do not reflect the actual litigation 
risk to the United States of the claim.  
This guideline prevents the Justice Department from paying a 
settlement simply because it believes the plaintiffs have a worthy 
cause rather than an actionable case. Congress has the constitutional 
authority to authorize the payment of the federal government’s 
money for worthy causes, and the executive branch may do so only 
pursuant to a statutory authorization from Congress. 
7. Assessments of litigation risk should be made by career lawyers 
responsible for the case in order to avoid even the appearance of 
political favoritism. 
This guideline serves two purposes. First, by leaving the 
assessment of litigation risk to the Justice Department’s career 
lawyers, it would prevent the political appointees from favoring those 
sympathetic to the administration or those whose causes are 
consistent with administration policy, thus eliminating any potential 
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political conflicts. Second, by creating a clear line of authority over 
risk assessment, the guideline will increase trust in the settlement 
process by avoiding even the appearance that political motives caused 
the Department to fudge its assessment of litigation risk. The 
assessment of litigation risk does not involve the kinds of policy 
decisions that should remain with accountable political appointees. 
Litigation risk is not, of course, a science, but it is predictive rather 
than normative, and, therefore, it should not worry us to leave the 
political appointees out of the process. 
8. The Department may not authorize payment of a settlement 
from the Judgment Fund if another account is available for the 
payment (even if there is currently no money in that account to pay 
the judgment).  
This guideline simply codifies the requirement of the Judgment 
Fund Act. It makes sense to include here, however, that the 
Department of Justice has a responsibility not to fudge its 
interpretations of that statute in order to get access to the deep 
pocket of the Judgment Fund. 
9. The Department may not waive defenses, such as the applicable 
statutes of limitations, that are conditions of Congress’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity. 
This guideline underscores the principle that Congress’s 
appropriations power may prevent the government from waiving 
certain defenses that may be waivable for private defendants. Only 
Congress has the right to dictate the terms on which the United 
States may be sued, and the Justice Department may not, on its own, 
change the terms under which Congress has permitted suit, even if 
the Department believes the cause to be worthy of compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The executive branch has long sought ways to avoid Congress’s 
clear constitutional authority over appropriations from the federal 
Treasury. Congress has created a web of statutes to enforce its 
appropriations prerogatives, but the executive branch continues to 
find ways to manipulate the appropriations process. The settlement 
authority of the Department of Justice remains one of the biggest 
loopholes to Congress’s control over appropriations. Unfortunately, 
neither the judicial nor legislative branch has any realistic hope of 
overseeing the Department’s settlement of cases. Instead, as is true 
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with many issues of executive authority, the executive branch must 
commit to a set of principles governing the settlement process in 
order to ensure that it respects Congress’s constitutional 
appropriations power. 
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